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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
EDHAR RONALD PENDERVILLE, 
Defendant and Appella;nt. , 
Brief of Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8053 
The defendant was arraigned in the District Court 
before the Honorable A. H. Ellett on the 6th day of 
December, 1952, at which time he entered a plea of not 
guilty. The case was set for trial eleven days later, 
to-wit, on December 17, 1952, at 10:00 A.M. (R. 7). On 
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the 15th day of December, 1952, defendant notified his 
attorney, Joseph P. McCarthy, that he did not want him 
to proceed with the defense of his case and that he was 
discharged from any further legal service in connection 
therewith. That the reason for said action was because 
defendant was satisfied that said attorney had not prop-
erly prepared his defense, notwithstanding he had ample 
time to do so and defendant had paid his requested fee 
and expenses of $1500.00. Thereupon defendant wrote a 
letter to the Honorable A. H. Ellett, judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court informing him of his action in 
discharging his attorney. Said letter was delivered to 
the judge of said court before 10 :00 A.M. on the 16th day 
of December, 1952. That a copy of said letter is as 
follows: (R. 57-58) 
"Honorable A. IL Ellett, Judge 
of the Third District Court of 
Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 
"Dear Sir: 
This morning I considered it necessary to my 
welfare to summarily discharge my attorney 
Joseph P .. McCarthy together with any assistants 
he has seen fit to record as associated with my 
case. 
In my opinion Mr. McCarthy has been abys-
mally negligent and derelict in his obligations 
relative to my best interests and in the so-called 
preparation of my defense. He impresses me at 
t~is point as being completely devoid of profes-
swn_al know-how and completely lacking any sense 
of h1s deep legal and moral responsibilities. There 
are other factors involved, not monetary, which 
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have influenced my decision but which I do not 
feel free to discuss at this time. 
In view of the foregoing I beg indulgence of 
the court and request a postponement of my trial 
until such time as I am able to engage competent 
legal counsel whom I feel will not only represent 
me but defend me. 
Respectfully yours, 
sf E. R. Penderville" 
On the 16th day of December, 1952, defendant was 
called before the Honorable A. H. Ellett in his chambers 
at approximately 9 :50 A.M. and in the presence of 
Miriam E. Parker, the reporter of the above entitled 
court, he engaged in a conversation with the Honorable 
A. H. Ellett, which conversation has been duly reported 
in the official transcript of the case from page 242 to 252 
inclusive (R. 316-325), as follows: 
"THE COURT: Mr. Penderville, I had a let-
ter from you this morning that gave me some little 
concern about your attorney. What is it that you 
have against him~ I thought he was doing you an 
excellent job. I don't know anything about it. 
1IR. PENDERVILLE: The whole thing, he's 
been giving me a lot of concern for a long time. 
Primarily, I wanted this thing to go to trial a 
couple or three months ago. I didn't want to wait, 
but the situation as it exists now is approximately 
this: Mr. McCarthy has had in his hand informa-
tion for a period of in excess of four months which 
he did nothing about. I felt that it was very 
definitely in my favor and something that should 
be prepared for the trial. 
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THE COURT: Are you having reference to 
the viewing of a chair in-
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. 
THE COURT: He was in yesterday working 
on that matter. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. No sir, it 
wasn't the chair, although that is one of the mat-
h~rs that was brought to Mr. McCarthy's attention 
at least two months ago, and apparently he didn't 
do anything about it until yesterday. 
THE COURT: Well, the thing that irks me 
a little bit is I am all set to try this case. I think 
there has been a deliberate stall of trying to put 
it over, and I wasn't going to be a party to that 
and don't propose to be now. I propose to try this 
case. 
~IR. PENDERVILLE: Well, it is no stall 
on my part, Your Honor. As I stated at the begin-
ning, as far as I was concerned, I wanted this 
thing over with. I don't enjoy being over in that 
county jail one moment. It's an entirely new 
experience to me, and as I have already stated, I 
don't like any part of it; but one thing and 
another, first the preliminary was postponed, and 
then this was postponed, and that was postponed, 
and :Mr. McCarthy's wife was having a baby. 
THE COURT: Now, Mr. McCarthy is ready 
to try this tomorrow, I am ready, the district 
attorney is ready, and the jurors are ready, and 
you come in with this monkey wrench to stop the 
machinery of court, and I'm not happy about that. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Your Honor I know 
that Mr. ~.cCarthy is not ready to try this case. 
In my op1nwn an attorney trying a case particu-
larly a case of this magnitude, should be ~repared 
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for any eventuality, and I am thoroughly con-
vinced that Mr. McCarthy is not. 
THE COURT: How do you know what he is 
going to do, how he is going to direct this trial~ 
illR. PENDERVILLE: Because we have dis-
cussed it together last night. 
THE COURT: You are not law trained, are 
you'? 
:JIR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. 
THE COURT: Have you ever had a case in 
court, criminal case in court before involving your-
self~ 
:.MR. PENDERVILLE: The only thing that 
I have ever been involved in is a military court-
martial. 
THE COURT : So you wouldn't be in a very 
good position to pass on his qualifications and on 
what he's planned for this thing. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, but I know 
from certain witnesses that are to be present for 
the State that Mr. McCarthy does not have infor-
mation at his hand. He has also been in a position 
to get the necessary information for the past four 
months. I have urged him repeatedly to get it. 
Some of it he attempted to get a week ago Sunday 
by long distance phone calls that he could have 
got four months ago for the use of a three-cent 
stamp, but he didn't check that until he found he 
was going to have to go to trial eleven days after 
I entered my first plea. 
THE COURT: Of course, you took time 
enough entering that plea. You took about three 
weeks to do that. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I didn't-that 
was his doings. I don't know. Last night I asked 
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him if he had checked three potential witnesses ~or 
me here in Salt Lake City. I have been beggin? 
him to check these people for months. UP until 
last night he hadn't contacted a single one of them, 
not a single one. 
THE COURT: Well, I am going to try this 
case tomorrow. You fired your attorney at a 
mighty inopportune time. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I don't know 
about that. The only thing I can do is plead not 
guilty, and that's that. 
THE COURT: Your plea is in. You have a 
plea of not guilty, and you have a jury coming in 
to ascertain the facts, and you have had plenty of 
time to make this decision heretofore. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I have given 
Mr. McCarthy this past week to whip this thing 
in order, and he has not whipped it in order. 
THE COURT: That is your opinion that he 
hasn't. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Yes, as I stated in 
my letter, that is my opinion. 
THE COURT: Of course, you are not in a 
very good position it seems to me from your train-
ing and experience to know whether he is giving 
you a good defense or not. You chose him. He 
wasn't appointed by the court for you. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: That's right. 
THE COURT: He was the attorney you 
chose in the beginning. 
MR. PENDERVILLE : That's right, I did. 
I knew no attorneys. Mr. McCarthy is the first 
one that I talked to. I was emotionally upset at 
the time, completely distraught. I had had two 
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convulsions over in the county jail the day before. 
I was desperate enough that I would have hired 
anyone, and everybody over in the county jail 
knows how I have been trying to get Mr. McCarthy 
to do these things. 
THE COURT: Have you talked to Mr. Mc-
Carthy about this letter~ 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. I told him 
last night that I was very much afraid that we 
had come to the end of the line. He called Doctor 
Anderson last night and so stated that he was 
afraid that he was through. 
THE COURT: Well, I will tell you what I 
think about you. I think you are just deliberately 
trying to get this case to go over. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, I'm not. I 
have done just the opposite. I personally have 
been trying to get it tried, but I knew when this 
date was set a week ago Saturday that Mr. Mc-
Carthy wasn~t by any means prepared. 
(Court talked to Mr. McCarthy on the phone). 
THE COURT : Well, I don't know. It's just 
-you may have a feeling on this thing here, but 
Mr. McCarthy tells me that the difficulties that 
you may feel that you have with him over the 
preparation of this trial involve matters which he 
thinks are remote and I am sure from what he 
tells me couldn't be brought into evidence, and it 
would just be your judgment of what a good trial 
would be as against his, and I think that you are 
making quite a mistake here. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: I'm not the only one 
that has this opinion, Your Honor. The opinion is 
shared by outstanding professional people in the 
city of Salt Lake. 
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r.rHE COURT: Whom do you have in mind? 
MR. PENDERVILLE: I have in mind for 
one Doctor Camilla Anderson. 
THE COURT: Well, you had better have 
some lawyer that will tell you because these doc-
tors wouldn't know what they could get in evi-
dence. Your background in the past isn't going to 
help you. This thing is going to come on what the 
facts surrounding this thing were. You could have 
been the best Sunday School boy in the world in 
the past, and it wouldn't help you. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: That I appreciate, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Because you couldn't get it 
in. It might help you, but you couldn't get it in. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: That I appreciate, 
and I am also cognizant of the fact that my life is 
at stake in this matter, and I don't believe that 
Mr. McCarthy is prepared. 
THE COURT: Well, he tells me he is. 
l\1R. PENDERVILLE: He did things, Your 
Honor, last Sunday by long distance telephone 
that he had every opportunity to do over the past 
four months. That I have proof of. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't know-
MR. PENDERVILLE: I have begged him 
to do these things. 
THE COURT: I don't know how much 
money he's had. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: He's had over fifteen 
hundred dollars from me, every single penny that 
I have had coming in every month and as of now 
I don't have one red penny with ~hich to employ 
another attorney, and I won't have until the first 
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of the month. However, I think I can get over that 
hurdle. 
THE COURT: You are going to be tried 
before the first of the month. I am going to try 
this case. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Then I will have to 
represent myself. 
THE COURT: If that is what you want to 
do, I am not going to permit that. I am going to 
have you an attorney, and I am going to have Joe 
McCarthy to represent you because I think he is 
prepared on this case. He tells me he is, and there 
isn't any reason in the world-I think you are 
doing this to stall this case, and I'm not going to 
let you do it. 
Mr. PENDER VILLE: No, I'm not doing it 
to stall anything. 
THE COURT : This case is set for tomor-
row, and you write me a letter today. You have 
had since August 1 to make your mind up on this. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: And I have given 
Mr. McCarthy all this past week ever since Decem-
ber 6 to do the things that he should have done 
three and four months ago. He hasn't even done 
those, not up until last night, not even up until 
six thirty last night he hadn't done them. 
THE COURT: Well, now, what is it you 
claim he hasn't done? He tells me he is ready. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: He hasn't investi-
gated to meet any possibility that might arise. He 
has admitted to me himself that he doesn't know, 
that he cannot say positively what will be entered 
in evidence and what will not. 
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THE COURT: Well, I suppose. he .wouldn't 
know that. He can't know what the d1stnct attor-
ney is going to do. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, but he is not 
prepared because he hasn't investigated angles of 
this case that even came out at the preliminary. 
THE COURT: Well, you had better stay 
with your attorney that is prepared for you in-
stead of trying to get one that the court would 
appoint for you because I am going to try this 
case tomorrow. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Well, I shall-
THE COURT: And if your evidence is not 
presented there and if you are found guilty, then, 
of course, you could file some affidavits for newly 
discovered evidence. I don't believe that Mr. Mc-
Carthy has sold you down the river. I think Mr. 
McCarthy has done you a good job in making this 
preparation. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: I can't help but be-
lieve at this time Mr. McCarthy has done anything 
but speak to me of appeal. He is not going to 
come in here and tell the court the things about 
which he spoke to me. He's done nothing but 
speak of appeal since he first introduced himself 
into the case. At this point, he's been talking 
about appeal for the last week or ten days. I have 
informed him that I am not interested in appeal, 
that appeal is not the matter at this time. The 
trial is the matter. 
(District Attorney Roberts comes into the 
Court's chambers)~ 
THE COURT: M-r. Roberts this gentleman 
feels that because Mr. McCarthy ~an't foresee all 
the evidence that is going to be presented here 
that he's let him down. I can't help but feel this 
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is a stall to keep from trying this case tomorrow. 
:l\Ir. l\leCarthy tells me he is ready, that he's 
worked on the case, that he thinks he is in position 
to present it, that he is willing to represent the 
gentleman. He doesn't desire to represent a man 
who doesn't want him to work for him. Do you 
have any ideas or suggestions here? 
l\IR. ROBERTS: Well, has Mr. Penderville 
in fact fired, discharged Mr. McCarthy? 
THE COURT: Mr. McCarthy didn't know 
anything about it. He's written me a letter in 
which he says he has. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: I told Mr. McCarthy 
last night that it was very probable that I would, 
and he called Doetor Anderson last night and con-
veyed that information to Doctor Anderson last 
night. It is particularly evident to support my 
statement that he has had notice that it probably 
was coming. I have been attempting to explain 
my position to Judge Ellett. In my opinion, Mr. 
McCarthy has had four months. I wanted to go 
to trial on this thing myself a couple of months 
ago and get it over with. Mr. McCarthy in the 
period of the last eight days did attempt by long 
distance phone calls what he could have done with 
a three-cent stamp three or four months ago. 
THE COURT: Of course, I don't know that 
that matters to you-
MR. PENDERVILLE: He still doesn't have 
it. 
THE COURT: -how he gets his prepara-
tion or whether he determines that a phone call 
might be better than a stamp. I don't see how that 
gives you any occasion for alarm. 
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MR. PENDERVILLE: My point, Your 
Honor is that he was informed of these contin-
' gencies four months ago. 
THE COURT : Informed nothing. He and 
you were the ones that have been asking for this' 
thing. You stood up in open court and asked me 
each time that this thing go over. I have been try-
ing to get this to trial for over a month. 
MR. PENDERVILLE : I asked that at the 
behest of my attorney. I didn't know what his 
plans were, what he was attempting to do. I be-
lieve Mr. Roberts is aware of certain develop-
ments that came by long distance phone and which 
I believe the necessary papers have been sent for 
a deposition. That was information that Mr. 
McCarthy had four months ago. 
THE COURT: The State can't use a deposi-
tion on you. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir. I am merely 
stating that I believe Mr. Roberts is aware of that. 
MR. ROBERTS: Joe asked me the other day 
if I would agree to having some interrogatories 
sent down to a doctor in San Francisco, and I 
agreed that I would have no objection and that he. 
could go ahead and do it, and I would not raise 
any question about it at the trial, and so those 
were sent down. That is the last I heard of them, 
and that has been about a week ago. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: And he hasn't re-
ceived them up until last night, but that is one of 
my points. He was in possession of that informa-
tion four months ago. I have begged and implored 
him, cajoled him, everything to try to get this 
information. 
THE COURT: You don't know whether he 
has those answers or not. 
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~lR. PENDERVILLE: I know he sent them. 
At least he told me he sent them. 
THE COURT: But you don't know whether 
he has them back or not. He says he is ready. 
l\IR. PENDERVILLE: He told me last night 
he hadn't received them yet. 
THE COURT: Well, do you want me to 
appoint a lawyer for you~ 
l\IR. PENDERVILLE: I think that I can 
make arrangements, or I should like after this 
incident-! should certainly like to see three or 
four attorneys. 
THE COURT: I'm not going to do that. I 
will tell you, because I think you are stalling on 
me, I will appoint a lawyer if you want to, or you 
can go ahead with Mr. McCarthy, and it is imma-
terial to me which you do. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No sir, I shan't go 
ahead with Mr. McCarthy because I know defi-
nitely he is not prepared. 
THE COURT: Well, I am going to appoint 
him for you anyway, and this case is going to trial 
tomorrow. You will be prepared for it. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Yes sir." 
That on the morning of the 17th of December, 1952, 
Joseph P. McCarthy contacted defendant in the court-
room before court convened and told him that Judge 
Ellett had appointed him to conduct the defense at the 
trial of said case, and that if defendant had any objec-
tions to proceeding with the trial with Joseph P. McCar-
thy as affiant's attorney, to make the objections to 
Judge Ellett in his chambers and not in open court before 
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the jury panel as the judge did not want the jury 
prejudiced by any statements made by any of the parties. 
Thereupon defendant told said attorney that he had made 
strenuous objections the day before to Judge Ellett 
against the appointing of said attorney to represent him; 
that he would prefer to try his own case if he would not 
let him employ other counsel, and the judge positively 
refused to let him do so, stating that he was going to 
appoint said Joseph P. McCarthy notwithstanding that 
defendant told the court that he would not go ahead with 
Mr. McCarthy because defendant definitely knew that 
said attorney was not prepared; that the court thereupon 
told defendant that he was going to appoint him anyway 
to defend him and that the case was going to trial the 
next morning; that said attorney thereupon told him that 
he could not do anything about it as the court had 
appointed him to represent him; defendant thereupon 
asked said attorney what he should do and said attorney 
told him he had done everything he could do in view of 
the judge's ruling that the case was going to be tried 
and that said attorney would have to represent him. That 
later in the morning and before the court convened, 
defendant was called into the chambers of Judge Ellett 
and, in the presence of Mr. Brigham E. Roberts, counsel 
for the State, Miriam E. Parker, reporter of the court, 
and the defendant, Edgar Ronald Penderville, and out of 
the presence of the jury, the following conversation took 
place: 
. ".THE COURT : Let me ask you gentlemen 
In this case that is on trial, the State vs. Edgar 
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Ronald Penderville, is the State ready in that 
case, :Mr. Roberts? 
.MR. ROBERTS: The State is ready. 
THE COURT: And is the defendant ready, 
Mr. :McCarthy~ 
~IR. ~IcCarthy: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: Very well. I have your re-
quested questions to be asked on voir dire, and I 
suppose there are no other preliminary matters 
here~ 
MR. McCARTHY: None that I know of." 
(R. 64) 
A careful . analysis of the evidence in this case is 
necessary to give to the court the basis of many of the 
assignments of error stated in this brief. Defendant was 
charged by the information with the crime of murder in 
the first degree for killing his wife, June Weiler Pender-
ville, on or about July 30, 1952. In the presentation of 
the facts, we will segregate the direct evidence surround-
ing the homicide from the maze of medical testimony 
introduced in the case. 
At 5:15 P.M. on the 30th day of July, 1952, Dr. 
Lyman Condie came to defendant's apartment, No. 2 at 
1012 Barbara Place, in answer to defendant's request 
that he see his wife, June Weiler Penderville, who was 
suffering from an alcoholic and barbiturate addiction (R. 
118). Dr. Condie had previously been treating Mrs. 
Penderville for chronic alcoholism. He had indicated 
that Mrs. Penderville would have to be sent to the Salt 
Lake County Hospital for treatment, and if necessary, 
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committed to a mental institution (R. 119). The doctor 
advised Mr. Penderville that if he did not comply with 
his request, he did not wish to have anything more to do 
with the case. Mr. and Mrs. Penderville said they would 
let him know the following morning. Mrs. Penderville 
at that time was under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
and pleaded for something to help her sleep. The doctor 
gave her three one-and-a-half-grain seconal capsules and 
left one grain-and-a-half seconal capsule with Mr. Pen-
derville to give his wife if further sedation was neces-
sary (R. 119). The doctor explained that he gave this 
heavy dose of barbiturates for the reason that the exces-
sive use of alcohol creates a high tolerance to barbitu-
rates. At that time Dr. Condie observed that Mrs. 
Penderville had some old contusions about the eyes, 
which he called black eyes. They were of old origin. She 
had a few old contusions about the face, particularly on 
the cheeks and jaw. They were light purple to yellowish 
contusions. She was not bleeding from the nose or mouth. 
There were no marks on her neck that were visible. He 
left at 6:00 o'clock P.M. (R. 120). Later that evening 
at approximately 9:45 Dr. Condie received a call from 
William Christensen, an attorney, to come to the Pender-
ville apartment. He arrived there at approximately 9:55 
P.M. He was met at the door by Mr. Penderville who 
said, "Hurry, I think she has a pulse." Immediately he 
went to Mrs. Penderville and could obtain no pulse. He 
listened to her heart and could hear no heart beat and 
observed no effort at respiration. He thought she was 
dead at that time (R. 121). He made an examination of 
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her body and there was a difference 1n the condition 
which he found at that time compared with his observa-
tions earlier that sa1ne evening. She had some large con-
tusions or black eyes about the orbit of the head. They 
were considerably larger than what he had observed in 
his first examination and the blood or skin in that area 
was dark purple. She also had contusions and abrasions 
about the face, neck and the chest. He had not observed 
these contusions in his earlier examination because she 
was fully clothed. The contusions about the neck and face 
were of recent origin. He stated that Exhibits B and C 
were a true and correct representation of the upper area 
of her body, neck and head as he observed it when he 
arrived at 9 :55 P.M. ( R. 122). He further stated there 
was blood in her nostrils and mouth and that when he 
examined her ears with an otoscope, he observed a very 
small punctate hermorrhage in both tympanic membranes 
or eardrums. The only people present at the time he 
returned were 1\fr. Penderville and Mr. Christensen. 
On cross-examination by defendant's lawyer, Mr. 
Joseph P. :McCarthy, Dr. Condie testified that he had 
examined Mrs. Penderville previously on July 27th, and 
on redirect examination by Mr. Roberts, after having 
been given leave to ask some questions on direct exami-
nation, the following testimony was given by Dr. Condie: 
(R. 130) 
"THE COURT: Yes, you may reopen your 
direct. 
Q. Was there any further conversation at 
your meeting on the 27th with them concerning 
her physical condition~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
A. I was conversing with Mr. Pen~erville, 
and he was discussing the various col!tus1o~s she 
had and she said 'He hit me ' and he 1mmed1ately 
' ' ' k d denied that. He said, 'Oh, you were drun an 
were stumbling around the room.'" 
The doctor testified that he did not detect the odor 
of alcohol or paraldehyde on the breath of Mr. Pender-
ville at his first visit on July 30th between 5:15 to 6:00 
P.M.; that he paid no attention to Mr. Penderville on his 
second visit to the apartment at 9:55 as he was too busy 
with 1\Irs. Penderville (R. 138). He stated that when he 
arrived at the apartment on the 30th he detected paralde-
hyde on the breath of the deceased Mrs. Penderville. He 
further stated that paraldehyde is related to alcohol in 
its chemical structure and is a sedative and hypnotic and 
is characterized as a central nervous system depressant. 
He further stated that he had prescribed paraldehyde 
for the deceased Mrs. Penderville (R. 126). 
SUSAN ELIASON- Witness- (R. 138) 
Susan Eliason resides at 1012 Barbara Place, in 
apartment No. 3 right over apartment No.2 occupied by 
Mr. and Mrs. Penderville. She was then 14 years of age 
and in the ninth grade in school. The bedroom and bath-
room of the Eliason apartment are directly over the bed-
room and bathroom of the Penderville apartment (R. 
139). Miss Eliason testified that she was getting dressed 
at about the hour of 7:00 on July 30th. She was in the 
bedroom and bathroom directly over the corresponding 
rooms of the Penderville apartment. She heard a noise 
coming from below. She testified : 
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"I wasn't sure what it was. It sounded like it 
was strunping and a lot of racket and beating on 
the wall and things like that. * * * It sounded like 
something was thumping on the floor and against 
the wall. * * * It lasted until about seven twenty-
five, around that time. * * * I didn't know what 
it was. I thought they were making a lot of noise, 
and it made me mad, so I stamped my foot on the 
floor to quiet it. * * * It kept going on." (R. 140) 
She left the apartment about 7:25 and the noise was 
still continuing when she left. She did not hear any cries, 
or outcries, or screams of any kind, or persons voices at 
all. The only thing she heard was the sound which she 
described as above. She said she was going out on a 
date and she started to get ready a little before 7:00 and 
she was running the bath water and she could still hear 
the sound below. She couldn't tell exactly where it was. 
She said, "I know it was in the vicinity of the Penderville 
apartment." When she returned later that evening she 
learned of the death of Mrs. Penderville at the Pender-
ville apartment (R. 141). 
On cross-examination Miss Eliason stated that the 
noise she heard "sounded like someone was stamping 
their feet or something hard on the floor, just pounding." 
She further stated she heard no voices, no outcry, no 
yells or screams of any kind; that she passed by the door 
of the Penderville apartment on her way out and, in 
answer to the question if she heard the noise as she went 
by, stated, "I wasn't exactly listening. I was kind of in 
a hurry and ran down the stairs and hurried out." She 
further stated in coming down she did not hear any out-
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cry at all (R. 144). She stated that she did not make any 
comment at anytime between 7:00 and 7:25 to her mother 
or anyone else who may have been home. She said her 
mother did not hear it and proffered the explanation 
that her mother was on the other side of the house watch-
ing television ( R. 145). She knew the Pendervilles had 
a 1947 Cadillac but she did not remember seeing it out-
side when she left. 
WILLIA~1: J. CHRISTENSEN (R. 148) 
William J. Christensen, a lawyer, was called by the 
State and testified as follows: That on the 30th of July 
he received a telephone call from the defendant at about 
fifteen minutes before 9 :00 in the evening. That pursu-
ant to this call he went down to the Penderville apart-
ment at 1012 Barbara Place and he arrived there around 
9 :00 o'clock or maybe a few minutes before. }.fr. Pender-
ville was there and his wife, ~Irs. June Penderville, was 
lying on the living room floor. A chenille bedspread was 
over her body. He could see the straps on a slip and there 
was an ice pack on her eye and head. He states Exhibit 
D does not show the approximate position she was in 
when he arrived. There was no pillow under her head 
and her neck was not stretched back as shown in the 
exhibit. She was lying on the floor and her head was a 
little to one side, with an ice pack covering most of her 
head. She was moved to the position shown in Exhibit 
D after the photographers and detectives arrived there. 
He left the apartment about 2 :00 A.M. on the morning 
of July 31st (R. 149). 
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On cross-exa1nination ~[r. Christensen stated that 
he rang the door bell and the defendant appeared and 
when the witness started to tell the conversation, the 
State objected on the grounds it was hearsay. Defend-
ant's attorney, ~lr. McCarthy contended it was part of 
the res gestae and the court sustained the objection (R. 
151). ~lr. Christensen testified that his curiosity was 
naturally aroused when he observed Mrs. Penderville on 
the floor and in answer to the question, "Did you ask 
any question, what happened or something to that effect," 
the State objected to the conversation on the ground of 
hearsay and the court sustained the objection. Defend-
ant's attorney contended that the conversation was part 
of the res gestae. The court then asked the question, 
"How long was it after you were called before you 
arrived~" Mr. Christensen answered, "Ten or fifteen 
minutes after I was called." The court again sustained 
the objection. The witness testified that the defendant 
did not appear to be upset; that he was perfectly 
rational; that he did not seem to be alarmed or fearful; 
that he appeared to be about normal as he had observed 
him on other occasions. The witness testified that Mrs. 
Penderville was alive and breathing rather heavily when 
he arrived. That about forty-five minutes later she dis-
continued breathing. Mr. Penderville first noted the 
change in his wife's condition and he said, "She's quit 
breathing," and the witness said, "Well, you had better 
get a doctor right away." Mr. Penderville requested him 
to call Dr. Condie and that he would have to use the 
office phone as the phone in the apartment was not 
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connected. He called Dr. Condie and the doctor told him 
he had an emergency call and did not know whether he 
could come or not. He told Mr. Penderville of the con-
versation with Dr. Condie and the defendant said, "My 
gosh, we have got to have somebody. We have got to 
get him or someone else." ( R. 155). Mr. Penderville then 
went down to call a doctor. He was gone about five or 
six minutes. In about ten or fifteen minutes Dr. Condie 
arrived (R. 156). The witness was asked hy the defend-
ant's counsel if he noticed the conduct of the defendant 
at the time the doctor first arrived and his answer was, 
"Yes, sir." When he was asked what he observed the 
court sustained an objection on the ground it was not 
proper cross-examination. Mr. Penderville called the 
police and the resuscitator squad arrived about 10 :00 
o'clock P.l\I. Detectives Frank Gilbert and Del Duncombe 
arrived. The witness was not permitted to testify as 
to what he heard of the questioning of Mr. Penderville 
by these detectives as the court sustained the State's 
objection that it was immaterial, irrelevant and not 
proper cross-examination. After the detectives arrived 
there was a virtual parade of photographers and other 
persons that came to the apartment. The arrangement of 
the body was altered from time to time while he was 
there. It was altered in the preparation by the photogra-
phers by putting the pillow up under her shoulder and 
stretching her head back so her neck was exposed (R. 
161). The following testimony and rulings of the court 
are pertinent: 
"Q. Then I believe you testified that he did 
replace the ice pack~ 
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A. That is correct. He went into the kitchen 
and then came back-
MR. ROBERTS: Now-
THE COURT: Don't give us-let's get this 
thing over and get out of the treadmill. Just 
answer the question without a dissertation. Go 
ahead ilir. McCarthy. 
Q. What did the defendant do after that~ 
A. I believe it was shortly after that that 
the doorbell rang. Well, he continued his conver-
sation with me right after that. 
MR. McCARTHY: Your Honor, I know you 
have ruled that we can't repeat the subject matter 
of the conversation. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. McCARTHY: Is it a proper question 
to ask what the conversation concerned without 
an attempt to repeat any of the language~ 
THE COURT: Well, you go ahead and ask 
the questions you want to. I will rule on the 
objections if they are made. I suppose counsel-
Q. What was the subject of the conversa-
tion~ 
MR. ROBERTS: We object to it as imma-
terial and irrelevant and hearsay. 
THE COURT: That objection will be over-
ruled. 
MR. ROBERTS: And calling for a conclu-
siOn. 
THE COURT: That objection is overruled. 
Q. Would you answer~ 
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MR. ROBERTS: Of course, we object to it 
also Your Honor on the ground it is not proper 
' ' cross examination. 
THE COURT: That objection will be sus-
tained. 
MR. ROBERTS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. McCARTHY: Apparently we are go-
ing to have to recall you as our own witness. I 
believe that will be all for now then." (R. 163-164) 
<L J. MURPHY- (R. 166) 
Mr. G. J. :l\Iurphy testified that he lived at 1012 
Barbara Place and he was the caretaker of all of th~ 
thirty-nine apartments including the motel rooms. That 
he was acquainted with the defendant and his wife, June 
Weiler Penderville, having met them about the 1st of 
July, 1952, when they rented apartment No. 2 at 1012 
Barbara Place. That during the month of July he heard 
the defendant arguing with his wife in the bedroom. 
Defendant said, "Get up, get up, get up off your dead 
ass and get me something to eat. You haven't cooked me 
ten meals in the last six months." (R. 169). He heard 
other conversations but could not recognize the words, 
except he heard the defendant say, "You know where it 
is, you get it." He never heard Mrs. Penderville say any-
thing back to these statements. He said he was in and 
about and around the apartment throughout the 30th day 
of July. He knew the Pendervilles had a 1947 Cadillac; 
that it was constantly there, and on the 30th day of July 
he saw it there all day (R. 170). He first testified that 
he did not see the defendant at anytime during the day 
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of the 30th of July (R. 171). Later in answer to the 
question, .. How n1any times did you see the defendant, 
the witness stated: 
·· ~\. Well, I saw him the first time about five 
o'clock when I came in. That's generally when I 
get through. Sometimes I have to go out after 
dinner and pick up my hose or something, but at 
five o'clock he was at the phone when I went 
through the office to go to our apartment; and 
then, of course, naturally when we hear somebody 
come in the door, we always go see who it is, see 
if somebody wants something, and at five thirty 
again he was in there again, and so on up to about 
six thirty he was in and out using the phone. Of 
course, we don't know who he is talking to. We 
don't want to know. It isn't our business. 
Q. That's all right. Did you see him again 
after six thirty~ 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What time was the next time you saw 
him~ 
A. It was, oh, perhaps seven thirty. 
Q. And where was he at that time~ Where 
did you see him at that time. 
A. He came down to use the phone again. 
Q. And when did you next see him~ 
A. I don't think I saw him after that until 
the officers took him out. 
Q. And that was the last time that you saw 
him then before the officers-
A. Yes." (R. 172). 
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On cross-examination his attention was called to his 
testimony at the preliminary hearing in the transcript of 
that hearing on page 93, as follows: 
"Q. Question, "Now, calling your attention 
to July 30, did he have occasion to use your phone 
numerous times that evening1" Answer, "Yes." 
Question, "Will you relate to the best of 
your recollection as to how many times and when 
he used your phone 1" Answer, "Well, he used it 
about five o'clock, five thirty, five forty-five, and 
six thirty, and then again about nine thirty, nine 
or nine thirty." 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. There is no mention of the time there of 
seven thirty, at all? 
A. Well, it was possible I didn't think of it 
at the time." (R. 174). 
The witness further testified that he did not see where 
Mr. Penderville came from when he made the telephone 
call at 7:30. When the witness came in the office door, 
Mr. Penderville was inside using the phone (R. 175). 
DELBERT F. DUNCOMBE- (R. 177) 
Mr. Duncombe stated he was a police officer for Salt 
Lake City for some twenty-three years. That he received 
a call about 10 :09 on the night of July 30th to go to the 
defendant's apartment. He arrived there four or five 
minutes later. Two other police officers Dr. Condie Mr. 
' ' Christensen and defendant were in the apartment. He 
made certain investigations for blood spots or marks. 
Those that he found in and around the place he directed 
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pictures to be taken of. He identified State's Exhibit J 
as a true and correct representation of the north part 
of the living rooin and the upper portion of the chair 
which is along the east wall. He discovered blood there 
on the chair and on the wall as shown in said exhibit. 
He indicated to the jury that the black marks or spots in 
the background on Exhibit J were the spots he had 
reference to. On the back of the chair were blood spots 
or smears. He identified Exhibit K as a true and ~orrect 
representation of the box marked "books." The picture 
was taken from the north toward the south. The witness 
testified he had no experience in chemical analysis, but 
the spots appeared to be blood to him. He testified the 
spots on the box appeared to be very fresh. No tests or 
typing were made of the alleged blood spots to determine 
whether the blood came from the deceased or someone 
else. No laboratory tests were made. The witness pointed 
out on Exhibit K to the jury the spots in question. He 
testified as follows: 
"A. This is a box that contained books. This is 
where the head of the body was lying, and the 
black spot was here on the bottom of the box, 
what appeared to be blood to me, also this little 
black spot here right on the edge of the carpet and 
the box, right here on the carpet was headed so 
in the picture the blood-what appeared to be 
blood had come back into the carpet, which doesn't 
show on the picture here." (R. 183). 
He identified State's Exhibit Las a true and correct 
representation of one of the places where alleged blood 
spots appeared. He identified Exhibit M as another 
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place where there appeared to be blood spots. The pic-
ture shows a portion of the living room with two spots 
on the wall and the third spot on the door casing. The 
witness pointed out on Exhibits L and M the location of 
the~e alleged blood spots. He testified as follows: 
"A. These spots there on what we call a 
door jamb, that would be the part where the door 
goes in this way. This is the corner part of the 
davenette which sits in the living room. This is 
an entrance which leads into a hall here, the door 
going back into the bathroom here. These black 
spots that you see here, here, and here, here and 
here, over here and this one here all appeared to 
be blood spatters. This is where what appeared 
blood had run down this jamb. 
Q. And now on Exhibit M would you indi-
cate, please, where those spots appear¥ 
A. Yes. This would be the wall right above 
the arm of the davenette in the living room. This 
here spot, this spot here appeared to be blood 
spots, and this spot here appeared to be a blood 
spot which had been smeared. This is the facing 
of the door casing that you might call a four-
inch piece there. That black spot there which is 
smeared down, these were very fine lines. They 
looked like smears down there, appeared to be 
blood." (R. 184-185). 
He identified Exhibit 0 as the trousers that Pender-
ville had on at that time. He attempted to point out some 
spots indicating that some of them may have been made 
by some kind of food. Two small spots appeared to be 
blood. He stated that no chemical tests had been made 
of the spots on the pants (R. 186). On cross-examination 
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he said he had taken the pants from the defendant the 
next day about noon in the City Jail. During the exami-
nation of the defendant's trousers (Exhibit 0) a red 
capusle containing a red colored substance fell out of the 
watch pocket of the exhibit (R. 194). It was probably a 
seconal tablet which is usually packaged in that type of 
capsule. No chemical analysis was made of its substance. 
The witness testified he did not find any blood spots on 
any of the other clothing of the defendant. He did not 
find any blood spots on defendant's shoes. The witness 
did not testify to any alleged blood spots on any of the 
person or clothing of the defendant except two small 
spots which may or may not have been blood spots on 
his pants. 
The State rested and out of the presence of the jury 
defendant's counsel first made a motion to dismiss the 
case, which was denied; he made a second motion to dis--
miss the charge of first degree murder, which was 
denied; he made a motion to reduce the charge to second 
degree murder, which was denied; he made another 
motion to reduce to voluntary manslaughter, which was 
denied (R. 200-202). 
The first witness for the defense was Dr. E. Le Verl 
Barrett, a physician and surgeon. Dr. Barrett testified 
that he had l\1rs. J nne Weiler Penderville under his 
treatment from February, 1946 to February, 1949. He 
treated the deceased primarily for the after effects of 
excessive alcohol use. He testified that she was a chronic 
alcoholic ( R. 204) . 
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Dr. Jack Tedrow, a physician and surgeon specializ-
ing as a psychiatrist, testified that he treated Mrs. 
Penderville for chronic alcoholism and barbiturate addic-
tion from March 17 1949 to the last of April the same 
' ' year. In his opinion the deceased was a chronic alcoholic 
and barbiturate addict. He testified that alcohol and 
barbiturates have a cumulative effect to the extent that 
a person becomes very sensitive to the use of alcohol and 
requires more and more barbiturates. That both drugs 
affect the nervous system (R. 206). 
Dr. Willian1 D. O'Gorman, a physician and surgeon 
specializing in neurology and psychiatry, stated that the 
deceased was his patient from April 24-, 1949, until July 
1, 1949. He treated her for psychosis in psychopathic 
personality and addiction to alcohol and barbiturates (R. 
208). In his opinion the deceased was a chronic alcoholic 
and an addict to barbiturates. He testified that the 
effect of chronic alcohol and barbiturate, taking the two 
of them together, is a "vicious mixture, inasmuch as these 
people over a long period of time finally undergo a 
certain degree of degeneration of the brain. Prior to 
that, however, they lose considerable control of their 
own emotional reactions and, consequently, behavior 
becomes more and more primitive." The witness testified 
that a person addicted to alcohol and the use of barbitu-
rates bleeds more easily than a person who is not. In 
his opinion such a person would require a less severe 
blow to cause death than a person who was not addicted 
to the use of alcohol and barbiturates (R. 208-209). 
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Sidney E. Gilchrist, the director of laboratories for 
the Salt Lake City Health Department, testified that he 
received samples of urine taken fr01n the body of the 
deceased at the tin1e of the autopsy. That he examined 
the urine samples for alcoholic content. The sample of 
urine showed .:2-1 of 1 per cent of alcohol or .024 per cent. 
In cross-exmuination he testified that the percentage of 
alcohol in the urine translated into the concentration of 
alcohol in the blood would be equivalent to .171 per cent. 
He further testified that the point at which persons are 
under the influence of intoxication starts at .015 per 
cent; that the concentration of alcohol in the blood of 
the deceased indicated she was under the influence of 
alcoholic intoxication ( R. 212-213). 
Burton G. Clay, testified that he was the chief auditor 
of the Liquor Commission. At the outset of his testimony 
Mr. Clay apparently recognized one of the jurors and 
the court proceeded to chastize him in the following 
language: 
"THE COURT: It's highly improper for you 
to make any gestures or advances to a juror. You 
can't possibly have these other people to think 
you are honest if you are going to play with a 
juror. You embarrass that juror no end, for he's 
been instructed not to talk to you, and would you 
refrain from making any advances towards jurors. 
A. I'm sorry, Your Honor. I will." (R. 216). 
Mr. Clay identified Exhibits 3 to 9 inclusive as the 
records of Store No. 3, being the time cards, machine 
tapes and individual purchase cards of the defendant, 
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Edgar Ronald Penderville, made on the 30th day of July, 
1952 (R. 217-219). 
Anna G. Robison testified that she was a cashier for 
the Utah Liquor Commission and was so employed on 
the 30th of July, 1952, at store No. 3 at 2nd South and 
2nd East. She identified defense Exhibits 8 and 9 as 
liquor cards that had been signed by the purchaser in 
purchasing liquor at that store. She was not the regular 
cashier. She was relieving a Mrs. French on the 30th of 
July, 1952 (R. 221). 
Cleo Porter testified that she was a cashier for the 
Utah State Liquor Commission on the 30th of July, 1952, 
at store No. 3. Exhibit No. 3 is her time card, which 
includes the day of July 30, 1952. Exhibit No. 10 is the 
tape from the machine she cashed with on that day. 
Exhibit No. 9 was the purchase order. This purchase 
order and the tape showed a serial number 87550. The 
starting serial number for that day on purchases made 
was 87322. The finishing number of sales made was 
87907. That the number of sales made was 585. The 
witness testified that she punched in on her time slip at 
3 :41 P.M. That she punched out again at 6 :03 P.M. for 
lunch. That she punched back in after lunch at 6:40P.M. 
That she got off at 11:12 P.M. That the purchase card 
of the defendant bearing serial number 87550 was the 
226th sale that she made that day. The witness testified 
that the sales on Wednesday July 30 1952 were con-
' ' ' siderably under the average. The witness could not 
place the time when this sale was made under the pur-
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chase order 87550. It was definitely made after 4 :00 
o'clock in the afternoon and before 11:12 that night. The 
witness further testified there was no definite way she 
could peg the time when the actual purchase was made. 
The witness testified she did not know the defendant but 
she remembered seeing him in the store (R. 223-230). 
EVA W. SHAW testified that she was employed by 
the Utah State Liquor Commission as a cashier on the 
30th day of July, 1952, at store No. 3. She identified 
Exhibit No. 9 as a sales card for the purchase of a fifth 
of Davis County whiskey purchased on that date, July 
30th, as shown by the purchase cards purported to be 
signed by the defendant (R. 232-4). 
FRED M. NEWSON, testified he was the manager 
of the Davis Jewelry Company located at 161 South Main 
Street in Salt Lake City. That on the 30th of July, 1952, 
he sa.w the defendant and his wife, June Weiler Pender-
ville, between 10 :30 A.M. and noon that day. He had a 
conversation with them at that time. On cross' examina-
tion he placed the time as the 30th of July, 1952, as the 
job repair envelope bore that date and that was the day 
on which they picked it up (R. 235-6). 
DELBERT F. DUNCOMBE, who testified for the 
State, was called as a witness for the defendant. He 
testified that at the time he searched the premises of the 
Penderville aparbnent on the night of July 30th he found 
a bottle of Davis County whiskey. It was in a fifth of a 
quart bottle and it was about two-thirds or three-quarters 
full (R. 237). 
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WILLIAM J. CHRISTENSEN, a witness who testi-
fied for the State, was recalled as a defendant's witness. 
His attention was called to a conversation he had with 
Mr. Penderville at the Penderville apartment on the eve-
ning of July 30, 1952. Defendant's attorneys asked, 
t . ~" "Would you state now the subject of that conversa wn. 
Objection was made upon the grounds of "hearsay, call-
ing for self-serving statements, and calling for his con-
clusion as to what the subject matter was. The conversa-
tion itself would disclose it if it were competent." The 
court ruled that the witness may answer as to the subject 
matter without giving the conversation. "You may tell 
what you talked about, what the subject was about." The 
witness answered, "The first subject matter was about 
my inquiry about \\·hat was the matter and about the lady 
on the floor." The next question propounded to the wit-
ness was, "Did you have any conversation relating to the 
subject matter of this case'" The State objected on the 
grounds it was immaterial, and irrelevant, calling for 
conclusion, hearsay, self-serving declarations. The wit-
ness answered, "I find that rather difficult, Your Honor. 
My answer would be 'no,' that the case didn't exist then. 
At that time there was no chance to talk about something 
that did not exist." (R. 238-239). 
RICHARD A. CALL, testified he was a physician 
specializing in pathology and particularly legal medicine 
or forensic medicine. That he was then assistant clinical 
professor of pathology in the University of Utah College 
of Medicine. The doctor testified that a dose of alcohol 
plus another dose of barbiturates superimposed upon in-
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jury would cause death sooner and that in his experience 
chronic alcoholics as well as addicts of any type may die 
of relative minor injuries (R. 248-249), and that the con-
smnption of alcohol sufficient to produce a concentration 
of .02-± per cent of alcohol in the urine, plus a sedation of 
three grain and one-half seconal capsules would definitely 
cause a loss of body function and control, and such a per-
son would be more likely to fall (R. 250). The witness 
further testified that trauma was not the only cause of 
subdural hemmorrhages. Hemorrhagic diseases may re-
sult in what we call spontaneous subarachnoid or spon-
taneous subdural hemorrhage. Also there is a condition 
which occurs congenitally. In other words, it's an altera-
tion of certain vascular structures at birth. These may 
rupture spontaneously and result in subdural hematoma. 
"Q. Can tests be made to determine whether 
or not there was such other causes other than blow 
or impact that you mentioned~ 
A. There are many tests which could rule 
them out." (R. 250-251). 
The witness further testified: 
"Q. And if there is a concentration of alco-
hol and barbiturates, a small blow would be more 
likely to cause the condition we referred to, the 
massive subdural hematoma, than if it were ab-
sent~ 
A. Well, now, I can say yes to that question. 
That is correct. However, the readiness or the 
increased hemorrhagic tendency does not depend 
on the immediate level of alcohol or barbiturate. 
It depends on a long-term chronic condition like 
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chronic alcoholism or an addiction to some par. 
ticular drug." (R. 251-252). 
On cross-examination the witness testified that such 
a hemorrhage would not produce death; there would have 
to be some other superimposed condition (R. 254). The 
doctor testified it was impossible to tell what the two 
small spots were on Exhibit 0, the defendant's pants that 
he wore the night of July 30th. That a chemical analysis 
would have to be made to determine if the spots were 
blood (R. 257). (Detective Duncombe testified they had 
the appearance of blood). They could be blood, shoe 
polish or many other substances. A laboratory analysis 
would have to be made to determine what the spots were 
(R. 257). 
EDGAR RONALD PENDERVILLE, the defendant, 
IS a retired officer of the U. S. Army Engineers. He 
testified that on the 30th day of July, 1952, at about 6:45 
in the evening, he left his apartment and drove his 
Cadillac automobile down town to the liquor store at 2nd 
South and 2nd East; that he made a purchase of a fifth 
of Davis County whiskey. (This was the second purchase 
of whiskey he n1ade that day, the first purchase being 
made around 2 :00 in the afternoon when he was with 
his wife. They had been shopping prior to that time). 
From there he drove west on 2nd South and parked his 
car between Main and State. He then went across the 
street to the Pony Express Cafe where he ate his dinner. 
He then returned to the car and drove home. When he 
arrived horne he found his wife lying on the floor along 
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the wall. He lifted her out from the wall as best he could 
as he only has full use of one arm. Her nose was bleed-
ing. He went to the bathroom and rinsed out a wash cloth 
in cold water, bathed her face and went back and rinsed 
the cloth out again and folded it over her forehead. He 
then prepared an ice pack. Her right eye was swollen. 
He got the bedspread from the bed and put over her. 
About ten or fifteen minutes later he went downstairs 
and called 1\Ir. Christensen. He could not state precisely 
the time of the call but in his best judgment it was be-
tween a quarter of eight and a quarter after eight (R. 
271-274). Their first trip to town was primarily to have 
a watch band fixed and to leave two rings of June's to be 
sized. They went to the Davis Jewelry Store and talked 
to Mr. Newson, the manager of that store. Mr. Pender-
ville identified Exhibits 8 and 9 as the purchase requisi-
tions for liquor which he signed on that day (R. 287). 
(Exhibits 3 to 11 inclusive were admitted in evidence. R. 
288). The witness testified that when he returned from 
town with his second liquor purchase, he found his wife 
on the floor. He was not particularly alarmed. He de-
nied that· he killed his wife (R. 288). 
On cross-examination the witness testified as fol-
lows: That he left the apartment about 6 :45 that 
night. He told the officers that in the best of his esti-
mation he was gone about three-quarters of an hour. He 
could not place the exact time that he returned. That it 
could have been 7:30 or 7:45 P.M. He. did not believe 
it could have been earlier than that (R. 289). When he 
left the apartment his wife was in bed asleep. When he 
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returned she was out of bed. She apparently had re-
Inoved her dress and her shoes and stockings. She was 
in a different physical condition when he returned, in 
thi:-;, her right eye was considerably swollen, she was 
bleeding from the nose. He did not make any observation 
with rd'erence to abrasions and contusions on her scalp. 
1 le did pitH'<' the ice pack upon her head. After he re-
tunwd, the first phone call he made was to Mr. Christen-
~Pn, a lawyer. 1t was around between 8:00 and 8:15. 
1 le was not angry when he returned home that evening. 
\VlH·n he returned home his wife was breathing audibly 
as ~he was lying on the floor on her back. He did not 
clean up anything in the room after he returned except to 
take the wa~h cloth and bathe his wife's face. He did not 
remoYe any blood from the bed or any place else. Certain 
spots were pointed out to him by the officer. He did not 
know how they got there. He did not examine the spots 
closely. On redirect examination the witness testified 
that they had consumed the first fifth of whiskey. That 
he had a drink or two out of the second fifth after the 
inquisition started. He did not recall what he may have 
told the officers as he was given a one ounce dose of 
paraldehyde after the interrogation started at the police 
station. He testified that his skull had been fractured 
March 1, 1951 ( R. 289-296). 
CAMILLA M. ANDERSON, called as a witness in 
behalf of the defendant, testified as follows: That she is 
a physician specializing in psychiatry. She graduated 
from the University of Oregon Medical School. She be-
gan her training in psychiatry in January, 1931, in the 
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8tate of New York, and has been training in psychiatry 
continuously in psychiatric hospitals, courses, lectures, 
up to the present tin1e. That she is now teaching at the 
University of Utah :Jiedical School. She testified that 
paraldehyde is prin1arily a sedative. In larger doses it 
has the capacity to produce a1nnesia or loss of memory 
for what is happening without causing sleep. In other 
words, a person can be up and about, or he can talk, or 
he can carry out directions and have no memory, and the 
loss of memory begins almost immediately following the 
taking of the drug, within just a matter of a minute or 
two. It is a drug that is used in obstetrics very frequent-
ly, so that women in labor will not remember any of the 
occurrences of the labor and still will be able to cooperate 
in the delivery of the baby (R. 299). In answer to the 
question, "Does paraldehyde have anything to do with 
whether a person tells the truth or whether he would tend 
to falsify, is there any relation at all in that f' The wit-
ness answered : 
"A. That has not been worked out very care-
fully, Your Honor, but the over-all effects are 
comparable to sodium pentothal, which is used 
somewhat in psychiatry in the practice in an effort 
to determine truth and falsehood, and the patient 
apparently lacks voluntary directional activity 
while he is under this amnesic state." (R. 303-304). 
The witness further testified that she had sufficient 
opportunity to examine the defendant and. it was her 
opinion that an ounce of paraldehyde would produce am-
nesia or loss of memory to what was happening without 
being asleep. That paraldehyde affects the central ner-
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vous system in the same way as alcohol and barbiturates 
(R. 301). A large dose of paraldehyde may cause a vio-
lent reaction to the person taking the same and cause 
such a person to have abnormal behavior incident to other 
forms of intoxication, such as repeated stumbling and 
falling resulting in traumatic injuries (R. 303). 
DELBER'l, F. DUNCOME, called in rebuttal on be-
half of the State of Utah, testified that on the 31st day ·of 
July, 1952, at about the hour of 11:00 A.M., he had a 
conversation with the defendant in which the defendant 
stated in substance and effect that he returned 
to the apartment the night of the 30th about three-
quarters of an hour after he had left, and that would 
make it about 7 :00 or 7 :15. He further testified that at 
said time, in answer to the question, "Were you still 
angry at that time, the time he returned, and he replied, 
'I wasn't particularly angry, but I was angry when I got 
in because I had left her in the bed.'" (R. 305). He ad-
mitted the defendant was given paraldehyde in the course 
of this examination. On cross-examination the witness 
stated that the defendant was simply giving his estimate 
of the time when the events took place on the night of the 
30th. He further stated that after defendant had taken 
the paraldehyde he became very intoxicated. He stagger-
ed into the wall, bumped his head on the walls. When he 
got in the jail he batted his head into the iron bars and 
knocked himself flat (R. 307). 
ELIZABETH ROSS, called out of order as a State's 
witness, testified that she was a medical record librarian 
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at the L.D.S. Hospital (R. 275). She produced and identi-
fied Exhibit P, the hospital records of June Penderville. 
The records were under the name of Mrs. June Coggle. 
The records are available for the doctors who are serving 
the particular patients involved (R. 276). 
DR. MAURICE J. TAYLOR, a state's witness called 
out of order, testified as follows: That he is a medical 
physician and certified as an internist by the American 
Board of Medicine. That he knew the deceased, June 
Penderville, under the name of June Weiler Coggle. 
That he commenced treating her in August of 1949. That 
he saw her frequently over a period of time up until June 
3, 1952. That she was hospitalized in August ~r Septem-
ber, 1949, and then two or three admissions in 1951, and 
the last admission in May of 1952. During these occa-
sions blood tests were taken of the deceased. He made a 
complete liver function test on the patient on three occa-
sions, including all the various coagulation prothrombin 
times, blood chemistry, blood figures, bleeding times, 
and protein metabolism and liver function. The tests 
were normal. "That alcoholism in and of itself, per se, 
is not the cause of increased bleeding, but alcoholism 
which has damaged the liver may give rise to increased 
bleeding by the fact that the liver in its damaged condi-
tion does not produce a substance we call prothrombin, 
and prothrombin is a vital element in the develop1nent 
of coagulation and bleeding and the control of heinor-
rhage in individuals, and in alcoholics who have a severe 
state of liver damage as a result of the alcohol effect, 
when there is some doubt about whether the alcohol itself 
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produces that or whether it's lack of food and other 
factors; but in some individuals where they get what we 
call <'irrhosis of the liver the liver does not produce pro-
' thrombin, and prothrombin then is not available for the 
rapid coagulation and clotting of the blood." (R. 280). 
At the time of the three tests made upon the deceased, 
the li \'Pr function test:-; were normal and there was no 
damage at that time to the liver which might lead to a 
bleeding tend<·n<·y as a direct result of alcohol (R. 280). 
The witn<>~:-; testified that he saw the deceased at the 
Newhouse Hotel on May 13th, about eight or nine days 
later admitted her to the hospital, and subsequently saw 
her in hi:-; office on June 3rd. When he first saw the pa-
tiPnt at the Newhouse Hotel, "she was in a very ragged 
physical condition. She was thin and very disturbed emo-
tionally. She had lacerations of her scalp, back of her 
head, from which was oozing a purulent material. She 
was bruised around both eyes. Her face was battered and 
bruised. She had bruises on her body. She had evidences 
of fractured ribs on both the right and the left side in 
front, and she was bruised down over her private areas 
and on her legs. On taking her to the hospital, we x-
rayed her chest, which showed evidences of fairly recent 
healing fractures on both sides of the chest and the ribs. 
She had a skull x-ray done in which there was unequi-
vocal evidence of the possibility of a fissure fracture of 
the skull. As a result of her bruising and so on, we did 
liver function tests and blood studies to see if there was 
any relationship between that and a bleeding tendency. 
The studies did not prove any relationship, and there 
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were no other evidences of spontaneous bleeding during 
that period of time, and during all the period I knew her 
from '-!9 to '3:2 there were never any evidences of spon-
taneous bleeding or bleeding of any unusual nature." 
(R ·)~·)_ ·)~'l) . -"--- _..~..._ () . 
Both the State and defendant rested. The following 
Inotions were made in chambers out of the presence of 
the jury: ·•comes now the defendant and moves the court 
to dismiss the entire charge for failure of the State to 
prove the case." This motion was denied. "Comes now 
the defendant and moves the court for a directed verdict 
of not guilty." This motion was denied. "Comes now the 
defendant and moves the court to dismiss the charge of 
first degree murder for the reason that no premeditation 
has been proved." After argument by Mr. Roberts, coun-
sel for the State, the court said, "I will deny your motion 
and let him argue it and see if they believe it." (R. 309). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
FORCING DEFENDANT TO TRIAL WITH AN ATTORNEY 
WHICH HE HAD DISMISSED, AND REFUSING DEFEND-
ANT A REASONABLE TIME TO PROCURE OTHER COUN-
SEL, OR TO CONDUCT HIS OWN TRIAL, RENDERED DE-
FENDANT'S SENTENCE AND CONVICTION VOID AS A 
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 77-1-8 SUBPARAGRAPH 1, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953; AND FURTHER DENIED 
TO DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW AS REQUIRED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
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POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
THE FOLLOWING MOTIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT: 
(a) MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACTION AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE AND RENEWED AT THE 
CLOSE OF DEFENDANT'S CASE. (R. 200, 309). 
(b) MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE 
AND RENEWED AT THE CLOSE OF PEFENDANT'S CASE. 
(R. 200, 309). 
(c) MOTION TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO VOLUN-
TARY MANSLAUGHTER MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
STATE'S CASE. (R. 202). 
(d) THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND 
THE EVIDENCE, AS RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. (R. 50-66). 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM J. CHRISTEN-
SEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE CONVERSATIONS HE HAD 
WITH DEFENDANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE 
WAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PENDERVILLE 
APARTMENT. 
ARGUl\fENT 
POINT I. THE ACTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
FORCING DEFENDANT TO TRIAL WITH AN ATTORNEY 
WHICH HE HAD DISMISSED, AND REFUSING DEFEND-
ANT A REASONABLE TIME TO PROCURE OTHER COUN-
SEL, OR TO CONDUCT HIS OWN TRIAL, RENDERED DE-
FENDANT'S SENTENCE AND CONVICTION VOID AS A 
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, AND SECTION 77-1-8 SUBPARAGRAPH 1, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953; AND FURTHER DENIED 
TO DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW AS REQUIRED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
The facts with respect to this argument are ade-
quately, and in detail, set forth in Defendant's State-
ment of Facts and will not be repeated here. In summary, 
defendant on the 15th of December, 1952 wrote to the 
judge of the trial court, which letter was delivered to 
said judge before 10 :00 A.M. on the morning of the 16th 
of December, 1952. That in said letter defendant asked 
for a postponement of his trial for the reason that he had 
felt it necessary to discharge his attorney. On the morn-
ing of the 16th the judge of the lower court summoned 
defendant to his chambers and there in the presence 
of defendant, the judge, and his certified court reporter 
a rather lengthy discussion was had with reference to 
the postponement and the securing of counsel for de-
fendant. The following is pertinent: 
"THE COURT: You are going to be tried 
before the first of the month. I am going to try 
this case. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: Then I will have to 
represent myself. 
THE COURT: If that is what you want to 
do, I am not going to permit that. I am going to 
have you an attorney, and I am going to have Joe 
McCarthy to represent you because I think he is 
prepared on this case. He tells me he is, and there 
isn't any reason in the world-! think you are do-
ing this to stall this case, and I'm not going to let 
you do it. 
MR. PENDERVILLE: No, I'm not doing it 
to stall anything." 
It is defendant's contention that the lower court 
erred in refusing to grant defendant a postponement of 
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the trial in order to enable him to secure counsel to repre-
sent him. Further the court erred in failing to allow de-
fendant to represent himself and in appointing counsel 
for defendant whom the defendant had already dis-
charged. That based upon these two errors the defend-
ant wa~ not given a fair trial and was not accorded due 
proces~ of law as required by the Fourteenth Amend-
Inent of the Constitution of the United States. The crime, 
as alleged in the information, was committed on July 30, 
1952. The complaint and arrest of the defendant was had 
August 1, 1952. The information charging defendant was 
filed November 22, 1952. Defendant entered a plea of 
not guilty December 6, 1952, and a trial was had on De-
cember 17, 1952. Less than one month expired between 
the time the information charging the defendant with 
first degree murder was filed and the time the trial was 
held. The l!tah Constitution provides: 
"Rights of accused persons - In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
* * *." (Art. 1, Section 12.) 
Section 77-1-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides: 
"Rights of Defendants - In criminal prose-
cutions, the defendant is entitled: (1) to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel." 
In 5 Am. J ur. par. 10- Attorneys at Law, it states: 
"Every person, sui juris, who is charged with 
crime has the constitutional right to try his own 
cause, and a trial court is not justified in imposing 
counsel on a defendant against his will unless in-
' ' 
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deed, it appears that he is mentally incompetent 
or not sui juris at the time of the trial. The con-
stitutional provision relating to the right of a per-
son to have the assistance of counsel was inserted 
for the purpose of abrogating the common law 
practice under which prisoners accused of felony 
were denied such right, and to restrain the legis-
lature from denying it by statute. Such provision 
is merely permissive, and conditional upon the 
pleasure of the accused. Prefering the protection 
of the court or choosing to rely upon his own skill 
and ability, he may not desire the assistance of 
counsel. But he must elect by which method to 
proceed; he cannot insist upon examining one 
witness himself and then proceeding through his 
counsel." 
In the case of DIETZ V. STATE, 149 Wis. 462, 136 
NW 166, 173, the court states : 
"Every person sui juris, who is charged with 
crime, has the right to try his own case, if he so 
desires. The constitution guarantees him the right 
to be heard "by himself" as well as by counsel. 
(Constitution, Art. 1, par. 7.) 
"The trial court would not have been justi-
fied in imposing counsel upon the defendant 
against his will, unless indeed it appeared that he 
was mentally incompetent or not sui juris at the 
time of the trial." 
Application of this principle of law is supported 
in the case of BURGENDER V. STATE, 103 P. 2d 256, 
55 Ariz. 411, wherein the court stated: 
"Defendant insists that the action of the court 
in first denying him the right to defend himself 
and thereafter granting him such right violates 
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Sec. 24, Art. 2, of the State Constitution which 
provides : In criminal prosecutions, the a_ccused 
shall have the right to appear and defend 1n per-
son and by counsel, • • *" 
''It does not seem to us defendant's contention 
i~ right either in fact or law. The court's action 
wa~ induced by defendant's own equivocation. It 
appears he was able to employ an attorney and 
did so when fin;t charged with the offense and 
Judge Speakman's order requiring such attorney 
to continue his services was for the protection of 
defendant, who, prP~Ul!Jably, because of his youth 
and inexperience and the nature of his defense 
of insanity, was unable to defend himself in-
telligently. This order, although in the interests 
of defendant, was probably erroneous. If, how-
ever, he was entitled to defend himself without the 
assistance of counsel, the court offered to let him 
do so. He asked for counsel, actually he was per-
mitted 'to appear and defend in person, and by 
counsel.' (Sec. 24, Art. 2, supra) He was given 
and he accepted full measure of the constitutional 
right. 
"No complaint is made of the court's failure 
to postpone the trial. 
"* * * It is only persons who are sui juris 
and mentally competent who are permitted to de-
fend themselves without the aid of counsel. Note 
to State of :l\1innesota v. Townley, 17 ALR 266." 
The case of \YILKINSON V. YOUELL, 22 SE 2d 
356, 180 Va. 321, 359, is also interesting in this regard: 
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that no one 
accused of crime is compelled to have counsel if 
he does not so choose. On a writ of error in the 
Barnes case (Barnes v. Com., 92 Va. 794 at page 
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803, 23 SE 78-!) it was held that the record must 
show not only that the accused did not have coun-
sel but that he was denied that right before the 
judgment would be reversed. Judge Buchanan, 
speaking for the court in that case, said: 'Every 
person accused of crime has a right to have coun-
sel to aid him in making his defense, but no one is 
compelled to have counsel. * * * But we cannot 
presume that the trial court denied the prisoner 
the right to have counsel, or failed, if she were un-
able to employ counsel, to assign someone to aid 
her in her defense.' 
"In Watkins v. Commonwealth, 17 4 Va. 518, 
6 SE 2d 670, 671, this court speaking through Mr. 
Justice Eggleston, 'Cooley on Constitutional 
Limitations, 8th Ed., page 700, as follows: The 
right to counsel is permissive and conditional up-
on the pleasure of the accused. Preferring the 
protection of the court, or choosing to rely upon 
his own skill and ability, he may not desire the as-
sistance of counsel.' See State v. Yoes, 67 W. Va. 
546, 68 SE 181, 140 A. State Rep. 978." 
Defendant was before the court personally. There 
is no question raised as to his sanity and yet the lower 
court absolutely refused to allow defendant to represent 
himself and discharge his attorney. The court's own 
statement is to the effect: "If that is what you want to do 
I am not going to permit that. I am going to have you 
an attorney and I'm going to. have Joe :McCarthy to rep-
resent you * * *" The very attorney which defendant 
had discharged the day before is now appointed by the 
court to forcibly defend the defendant in this action even 
though the defendant has stated to the court that he does 
not wish representation under these circumstances. 
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With reference to allowing defendant a reasonable 
time to secure other counsel and to grant a postponement 
of the trial this court stated in the case of STATE V. 
FAIRCLOUGH, 86 U. 326, 44 P. 2d 692, as follows: 
"It is a general rule and justice requires, that 
a person charged with a crime should have a rea-
sonable time to prepare his defense, otherwise a 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial 
might be nullified. 8 RCL 67. To insure defend-
ant the full enjoyment of his constitutional privi-
lege, the time between the appointment of counsel 
by the court and the time of trial should be such 
as to afford a reasonable opportunity for prepara-
tion of the defense. 16 CJ 823, 84 ALR 545. The 
statute makes provision for the postponement of 
trial upon sufficient cause shown. RS Utah 1933, 
105-30-1. Whether a postponement of the trial 
should or should not be granted on showing made 
is a matter within the discretion of the trial court 
and the matter of postponement will not be regard-
ed as reversible error unless clearly prejudicial. 
State v. Williams, 49 e. 320, 163 P. 1104; State 
Y. Cano, G-! U. 87, 228 P. 563. What is a reason-
able time for preparation for trial depends on 
many things, such as whether the accused is con-
fined in jail or is at liberty on bail, the nature and 
gravity of the charge, the complexity of the facts 
or circumstances involved in the crime, the num-
ber and availability of witnesses, the intracacy of 
any law points that may be involved. Such matters 
being \Vi thin the discretion of the trial court, its 
decision is to be given great weight and ordinarily 
will not be disturbed except for manifest abuse of 
discretion or a showing of want of consideration 
of the rights of the accused. Harris v. State 119 
Ga. 114, 45 SE 973, 8 RCL 68." ' 
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Apparently it was the lower court's opinion that de-
fendant wa:s taking too long to prepare his defense for 
the ra:se. As previously stated less than a month expired 
between the time the information charging defendant 
with first degree n1urder was filed and the time the trial 
was held. This is a case of first degree murder in which 
the life of the accused is at stake. Certainly it cannot 
be held that such a period of time is unreasonable to 
allow defendant to properly secure the representation 
which he desires, and even in the event the court holds 
that defendant had sufficient time to secure his defense, 
the denial of the court to allow defendant to represent 
himself rather than have forced upon him an attorney 
whom he has discharged, certainly shows a want of con-
sideration of the rights of the accused. Defendant was 
confined in jail, he was not at liberty on bail. As far as 
the record is concerned defendant had never been in-
volved in a felony prosecution. This was an entirely 
new experience for him. Can there be any greater preju-
dice shown than forcing a defendant to trial with an at-
torney in whom he has no confidence~ It is unquestion-
able that there was a difference of opinion as between 
defendant and his former counsel as to how the trial 
should be conducted and the investigations that sho~d 
be made. Such is clearly set forth in the record that was 
taken down by the certified court reporter at the time 
defendant and the judge of the lower court discussed this 
problem. But in the end who must decide what repre-
sentation he is entitled to~ Certainly defendant being 
competent in all respects should be the one to decide what 
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he desires as far as representation is concerned and if he 
cannot secure it from his counsel in the way he so desires, 
then the constitution of the State of Utah and of the 
United State~ gives him the right to defend himself. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
THE FOLLOWING MOTIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT: 
(a) MOTION TO DISMISS THE ACTION AT THE 
CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE AND RENEWED AT THE 
CLOSE OF DEFENDANT'S CASE. (R. 200, 309). 
(b) MOTION TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE 
AND RENEWED AT THE CLOSE OF DEFENDANT'S CASE. 
(R. 200, 309). 
(c) MOTION TO REDUCE THE CHARGE TO VOLUN-
TARY MANSLAUGHTER MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
STATE'S CASE. (R. 202). 
(d) THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND 
THE EVIDENCE, AS RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. (R. 50-66). 
'Ve direct the following argument to all of the fore-
going motions. There is not a scintilla of evidence which 
directly or indirectly justifies the conclusion that defend-
ant was the perpetrator of the injuries sustained by the 
deceased on the 30th day of July, 1952. We admit that 
the deceased suffered traumatic injuries between the time 
that Dr. Condie left the Penderville apartment about 
6:00 o'clock P.M. and the return of the defendant to his 
apartment later in the evening. We particularly call t:he 
court's attention to the fact that it is not incumbent upon 
the defendant to explain how and in what manner the de-
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ceased suffered these traumatic injuries. It is incumbent 
upon the State to prove that the injuries were caused by 
defendant. ~lere suspicion cannot be used to hurdle this 
very ilnportant link in the chain of evidence if a convic-
tion for murder in the second degree is to be sustained. 
We have carefully analyzed the evidence in the above 
Statement of Facts. We again call the court's attention 
to the time element involved in this alleged crime. Dr. 
Condie arrived at the Penderville apartment at 5:15P.M. 
on the 30th day of July, 1952. He found Mrs. Pender-
ville suffering from alcoholic and barbiturate addiction. 
He had previously been treating her for chronic alco-
holism. He definitely told the defendant that she would 
have to be sent to the Salt Lake County Hospital for 
treatment and, if necessary, committed to a mental insti-
tution (R. 119). The doctor advised Mr. Penderville if 
he did not comply with his request, he did not wish to 
have any more to do with the case. Mr. and Mrs. Pender-
ville said they would let him know the following morning. 
Mrs. Penderville was under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor and pleaded for something to help her sleep. The 
doctor gave her three one and one-half grain seconal cap-
sules and left another with Mr. Penderville to give his 
wife if further sedation was required. Dr. Condie ob-
served Mrs. Penderville had some old contusions about 
the eyes, which he called black eyes. They were of old 
origin. She had a few contusions about the face, par-
ticularly on the cheeks and jaw. He left at 6 :00 P.M. He 
did not return that evening until approximately 9 :45 
when he received a call from William Christensen, an at-
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torney. These are undisputed facts in the case. The in-
juries which Mrs. Penderville received must have oc-
curred after 6:00 o'clock. 
The next important testimony is that of Susan Elia-
son, who testified that she resided in apartment No. 3 
right over apartment No. 2 occupied by Mr. and Mrs. 
Penderville. The bedroom and bathroom of the Eliason 
apartment are directly over the bedroom and bathroom of 
the Penderville apartment (R. 139). ::\fiss Eliason testi-
fied that she was getting dressed about the hour of 7 :00 
P.Thl. on July 30th. She was in the bedroom and bath-
room direetly over the corresponding rooms of the Pen-
derville apartment. She heard a noise coming from be-
low. It sounded like something was thumping on the wall 
or the floor and it lasted until about 7:25 P.M. Her 
testi1nony is fully quoted in the above statement of,facts. 
She left the apartment about 7:25 and the noise was still 
continuing when she left. She did not hear any cries, or 
outcries, or screams of any kind, or persons voices at all 
(R. 40). She did not pay any attention to the noise when 
she went downstairs and knew nothing further about the 
case until she returned later in the evening and learned 
of the death of Mrs. Penderville. There is no reason to 
disbelieve this young lady, who was 14 years of age and 
rather young to be going on dates. She had no reason 
to be making any misstatements. She said her mother 
did not hear the noise because she was in another part of 
the apartment looking at television. We accept the state-
ments of Susan Eliason to be true. Something occurred 
in the Penderville apartment between 7:00 and 7:25P.M. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
The defendant is a retired officer of the U. S. Army; 
Engineers. He testified that on the 30th day of July, 1952, 
at about 6:-1-5 in the evening, he left his apartment; drove 
his Cadillac auton1obile downtown to a liquor store at 
2nd South and 2nd East; he made a purchase of a fifth 
of Davis County whiskey. (This was the second purchase 
of whiskey he made that day, the first being made around 
:2 :00 in the afternoon when he was with his wife. They 
had been shopping prior to that time.) F'rom there he 
drove west on 2nd South and parked his car between 
:Jfain and State. He then went across the street to the 
Pony Express Cafe where he ate his dinner. He then 
returned to the car and drove home. When he arrived 
home he found his wife lying on the floor along the wall. 
He lifted her out from the wall as best he could as he had 
only full use of one arm. Her nose was bleeding. He went 
to the bathroom and rinsed out a wash cloth in cold water, 
bathed her face and went back and rinsed the cloth out 
again and folded it over her forehead. He then prepared 
an ice pack. Her right eye was swollen. He got the bed-
spread and put over her. About ten or fifteen minutes 
later he went downstairs and called Mr. Christensen. 
He could not state precisely the time of the call, but his 
best judgment was sometime between quarter of eight 
and quarter after eight (R. 271-274). The witness' testi-
mony was not disturbed an iota on cross-examination. He 
told the officers to the best of his estimation he was gone 
about three-quarters of an hour. He could not place the 
exact time he returned. It could have been 7:30 or 7:45 
P.M. He did not believe it could have been earlier than 
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that (R. 289). When he left the apartment his wife was 
in bed asleep. When he returned she was out of bed. Her 
dress, shoes and stockings had been removed. She was 
in a different physical condition when he returned than 
when he left her at 6:45 P.M. Her right eye was con-
siderably swollen, she was bleeding from the nose. He 
did not make any observation with reference to abrasions 
and contusions of the scalp. He did place the ice pack 
upon her head. He was not angry when he returned home 
that evening and was not particularly alarmed because 
of his wife's condition. A more detailed account of his 
testimony is given in the foregoing Statement of Facts. 
The court's attention is called to the corroboration of the 
defendant's testimony. Burton G. Clay, chief auditor of 
the Utah State Liquor Commission, identified Exhibits 
3 to 9 inclusive as records of Store No. 3, being the time 
cards, machine tapes, and individual purchase cards of 
the defendant, Edgar Ronald Penderville, made on the 
30th day of July, 1952 (R. 217-219). Anna G. Robison, 
Cleo Porter and Eva W. Shaw, three cashiers at Store 
No. 3, further identified these records. Exhibit No. 9 was 
the purchase order signed by the defendant. It bore 
serial number 87550 and was the 226 purchase of the 
585 sales n1ade at store No. 3 between the hours of 3:41 
P.l\1. and 11:12 P.M. that night. Witness Cleo Porter 
testified there was no definite way she could peg the 
time when the actual purchase was made. The testimony 
of these four witnesses clearly proved that two sales 
of liquor were made to defendant on the 30th day of July, 
1952; that the second sale was subsequent to 3:41 P.M. 
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and being the :2:2G ~ale of 585 sales, a reasonable person 
would conclude that the sale occurred sometime in the 
evening of that day as testified to by the defendant. 
Fred :\1. Newson, the manager of the Davis Jewelry 
Company located at 161 South Main Street, testified that 
he saw the defendant and his wife between 10:30 A.M. 
and noon of that day. He had a conversation with them 
at that time and on cross-examination referred to the job 
repair envelope that bore that date, and that was the day 
on which the Pendervilles were transacting business in 
his store (R. 235-236). 
Delbert F·. Duncombe, a state's witness who was later 
called by the defendant, testified that he searched the 
Penderville apartment on the night of the 30th of July 
and he found a bottle of Davis County whiskey. It was 
a fifth of a quart bottle and it was about two-thirds or 
three-quarters full (R. 237). 
William J. Christensen testified for the state that 
he went to the Penderville apartment about 9 :00 o'clock 
P.M. or a few minutes.,before on the 30th day of July in 
answer to a telephone call from Mr. Penderville. That 
Mrs. Penderville was lying on the living room floor with 
a chenille bedspread over her body. The witness testified 
that the defendant did not appear to be upset; that he 
was perfectly rational ; that he did not seem to be alarm-
ed or fearful; that he appeared to be about normal as he 
had observed him on other occasions. 
These witnesses certainly corroborate the defend-
ant's story. There is no question that he was up town 
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twice during the day of July 30th. He could not have 
signed the two liquor card purchases if he had not been 
uptown. The second purchase was certainly made hours 
after the girl went to work at 3:41 P.M. as it was the 226 
liquor purchase of the 585 sales made between the hours 
of 3:41 P.M. and 11:12 P.M. that day. There was not 
anything in the conduct and demeanor of Penderville 
when State's witness William ChristenHen arrived which 
would indicate guilt in any way whatsoever. The un-
fortunate part of Mr. Christensen's testimony was the 
egregious error made by the court in refusing to permit 
Mr. Christensen to testify to the conversation that he had 
with the defendant when he arrived at the Penderville 
apartment. This assignment of error will be treated later 
in the brief. 
nlr. G. J. Murphy, the caretaker of the apartments at 
1012 Barbara Place, was called by the State and was per-
mitted to testify that on or about a month before the al-
leged crime took place he heard the defendant arguing 
with his wife, in which the defendant said, "Get up, get 
up, get up off your dead ass and get me something to eat. 
You haven't cooked me ten meals in the last six months." 
This conversation was grossly immaterial and had no 
proper place in the case at all. The witness further testi-
fied he knew the Pendervilles had a 194 7 Cadillac. He 
said it was constantly there and on the 30th of July he 
saw it there all day (R. 170). This testimony was definite-
ly impeached by other State's witnesses. The e-vidence 
clearly establishes that defendant and the deceased were 
uptown at least once in the early afternoon and the de-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
59 
fendant alone was uptown in the early evening of July 
30th. The witness first testified he did not see defendant 
at anytime during the day of the 30th of July ( R. 171). 
Later, in answer to the question how many times did you 
see the defendant, the witness stated, 
"Well I saw him the first time about 5:00 
o'clock when I came in. That is generally when I 
get through. Sometimes I have to go out after 
dinner and pick up my hose or something, but at 
5:00 o'clock he was at the phone when I went 
through the office to go to our apartment; and 
then, of course, naturally when we hear somebody 
come in the door, we always go see who it is, see if 
somebody wants something, and at five thirty he 
was in there again, and so on, up to about six 
thirty he was in and out using the phone. Of 
course, we don't know who he was talking to. We 
dt>n't want to know. It isn't our business. 
Q. That's all right. Did you see him again 
after six thirty~ 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What time was the next time you saw 
him~ 
A. It was, oh, perhaps seven thirty. 
Q. And where was he at that time~ Where 
did you see him at that time~ 
A. He came down to use the phone again. 
Q. And when did you next see him~ 
A. I don't think I saw him after that until 
the officers took him out. 
Q. And that was the last time that you saw 
him then before the officers-
A. Yes." (R. 172). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
60 
His testimony was impeached by his own statements 
made at the preliminary examination rnany months be-
fore (P.T. 93) when he testified as follows: 
··Q. Question, 'Now, calling your attention 
to July 30, did he have occasion to use your phone 
numerous times that evening~' Answer, 'Yes.' 
Question, 'Will you relate to the best of your 
recollection as to how many times and when he 
used your phone?' Answer, 'Well, he used it about 
five o'clock, five thirty, five forty-five and six 
thirty, and then ~gain about nine thirty, nine or 
nine thirty.' 
A. Yes, he did. 
Q. There is no mention of the time there of 
seven thirty, at all~ 
A. Well, it was possible I didn't think of it 
at the time." (R. 174). 
The foregoing testimony is what the State relies 
upon to prove that the defendant killed his wife. There 
are no admissions or confessions of any kind whatsoever. 
The fact that she met with some traumatic injuries dur-
ing a period from approximately seven o'clock until seven 
twenty-five certainly does not justify a finding that the 
defendant committed the alleged violence on his wife. 
There is not any question that ~Irs. Penderville's nose 
was bleeding when Mr. Penderville returned. There is 
not any question that there was a difference in her physi-
cal condition as far as injuries were concerned from the 
time that Dr. Condie left her at six o'clock and when Le 
returned at nine forty five. There is not any question 
that there was a difference in her physical condition from 
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the time defendant left at about six forty five P.M. and 
when he returned about seven thirty or seven forty-five 
P.:\I. Defendant freely admitted that her condition was 
changed. He testified when he left the apartment his wife 
was in bed asleep. 'Yhen he returned she was out of bed. 
Her dress, shoes and stockings had been removed. She 
was in a different physical condition when he returned in 
this, her right eye was considerably swollen, she was 
bleeding frmn the nose. When he returned home his wife 
was breathing audibly and she was lying on the floor on 
her back. When certain spots were pointed out to him 
by the officer, he did not deny what they were. He stated 
he did not examine the spots closely. His wife had a se-
vere nose bleed and he did the normal and logical thing 
in rinsing out a wash cloth in cold water, bathed her face 
and went back and rinsed the cloth out again and folded 
it over her forehead and then put an ice pack on her head. 
At six o'clock Dr. Condie testified the deceased was 
in a state of intoxication from excessive use of alcohol; 
that he refused to treat her further unless they would 
agree that she be sent to the Cpunty Hospital and pos-
sibly to a mental institution (R. 119). She also at that 
time had been using paraldehyde as he detected it on her 
breath ( R. 126). This vicious mixture of paraldehyde, 
seconal and alcohol would cause a violent reaction to the 
person taking the same and cause such a person to have 
abnormal behavior, such as repeated stumbling and fall-
ing resulting in traumatic injuries (R. 301-303). It is a 
common observation to see drunk people stumble and 
fall causing severe traumatic injuries without apparent 
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pain or outcry. The central nervous system being anes-
thetized by depressants such as paraldehyde, seconal or 
alcohol or the combination of the same, readily explains 
' the absence of cries, screams and outcries which certainly 
would have been present if a normal person was under-
going ~mch punishment. It may be argued that during 
this thumping proce~~ Mrs. Penderville was choked off by 
some type of garrote and, therefore, was unable to make 
any outcry or scream. This theory is highly improbable 
if not impossible as a person could not be conscious for a 
half hour of such treatment. If she had been choked into 
insensibility the result would have been unconsciousness 
or death long before a half hour of such abuse. Further-
more, if there had been some sort of a noose about her 
neck, there is none the writer can think of which would 
produce two straight lines as Mrs. Penderville had in the 
pictures which are in evidence. (Exhibits B and C). If 
someone had choked her with some rope or tie and had 
bumped her head up and down on the floor the trauma 
would have been on the forehead and not on the vertex 
and back of the head. To have the bruises on her scalp 
where they were, the garrote would have had to extend 
all around her neck, and there was no evidence of any 
neck n1arks except on the front and one side of the neck. 
The marks on her neck might well have been produced by 
rubbing her neck from side to side over a moderately 
sharp piece of wood, such as the rung of a chair, and in 
fact, her head was resting on the rung of the chair when 
Penderville found her. 
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Dr. Richard Call, clinical professor of pathology at 
the University of Utah, testified that the consumption of 
alcohol sufficient to produce a concentration of .024 of 
alcohol in the urine, plus a sedation of three grain and 
one-half seconal capsules would definitely cause a loss of 
body function and control and such a person would be 
more likely to fall (R. 250). 
Again we repeat, it is not incumbent upon the de-
fendant to explain how she sustained these injuries. 
Where is there any evidence that the defendant commit-
ted any Yiolence upon his wife1 There has been an array 
of medical testimony introduced in this case largely con-
cerning the tendency of an alcoholic or barbiturate addict 
to bleed more easily than a normal person. Practically 
all of the medical testimony given in the case answers 
that issue in the affirmative. The high medical reputa-
tion of the men so testifying for the defense lends a lot 
of credence to their testimony. The State in rebuttal 
called Dr. :Maurice J. Taylor, who testified that sometime 
during the period from August, 1949, until June 3, 1952, 
on two or three occasions, blood tests were taken of the 
deceased. That he made a complete liver function test 
on the patient on three occasions, including all the vari-
ous coagulation prothrombin times, the blood chemistry, 
blood figures, bleeding times, protein metabolism and 
liver function. He stated the tests were normal (R. 280). 
His testimony is set out in detail in the above Statement 
of Facts. 
It is the consensus of opinion of the other doctors 
who testified in the case that the effect of alcohol in some 
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people is to alter not the bleeding time but the permea-
bility of the vessels in such a way as to permit extravasa-
tion of blood into the tissues upon the most minor trauma. 
This tendency to bleed is thus not possible of determina-
tion by use of the common bleeding time test, or the clot-
ting time test; that ecchymosis results in any minor ap-
preciable trauma. Irrespective of the apparent medical 
disagreement between the array of doctors called by the 
defense and Dr. Taylor, it is not incumbent upon the de-
fendant to explain medically, or otherwise, how the 
changed physical condition of the deceased occurred. 
Defendant's counsel are of the opinion that the injuries 
suffered by :Mrs. Penderville were the result of the ab-
normal reaction of the deceased to the large dosage of 
paraldehyde, seconal and alcohol taken by the deceased 
or given to her by the attending physician. Loss of body 
function and control in extreme alcoholism is a common 
experience with alcohol addiction. Alcohol addicts fall 
and commit serious traumatic injuries upon themselves. 
In going over the evidence, may we submit that the loca-
tion of the scalp bruise could best be accounted for by a 
fall-striking first on her knees (the court will note that 
the knee bruises were more recent than most of the 
others), then pitching forward striking her head on the 
edge of the arm chair and landing with her neck across 
the rung face down. The chair was against the wall and 
most of the blood spots were found on it. The deceased's 
head was resting on the rung when she was found but her 
face was up and she was lying supine rather than prone. 
That the banging heard by the girl upstairs was caused 
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by the deceased's efforts to free herself from the chair. 
She tried and tried to get free, banging the chair against 
the wall at each atten1pt and finally managed to get her-
self turned around face up, but in the process did two 
things: (1) She scratched her neck and one side of her 
face on the rung and leg of the chair ; and ~ 2) She used as 
strenuous effort as she was capable of using in her state 
and in so doing she elevated her blood pressure and thus 
encouraged increased hemorrhage from the injury which 
she had sustained to her brain and its coverings when she 
struck it in falling. The defendant's muscular disability 
in his left arm (R. 272) would have made it physically 
impossible for him to have lifted her weight with one 
arm and to have banged her head against the wall for the 
period of time the banging was alleged to have continued. 
No finger nail marks could possibly have made the even 
lines to be seen on her neck, and with her tendency to 
bleed, had the whole hand been used in knocking her head 
against the wall, hand marks would have shown up be-
cause of her tendency to bruise easily. There were nu-
merous blood marks on the walls and doors but, accord-
ing to the testimony and the exhibits, none were found 
above the elevation of the chair which would justify the 
finding that the trauma was caused by defendant's bang-
ing the deceased's head against the wall. Another inter-
esting observation is the fact that no blood was found 
on the defendant's clothing or his person. Detective Dun-
combe testified there were two small spots which had the 
appearance of blood on the defendant's pants, Exhibit 0. 
There is no competent evidence that would justify the 
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finding that these two small spots were blood. There 
were other spots which the detective admitted were food 
spots. The fact that his shoes and the rest of his clothing 
contained no blood spots of any kind, is the strongest evi-
dence that the defendant did not and could not have 
banged his wife's head against the floor or the walls for 
a period of at least a half hour as indicated by the testi-
rnony of Husan Eliason. The numerous blood spots 
pointed out by Detective Delbert F. Duncombe on the 
chair, the wall, the books and the box that contained the 
books, the floor, the bed, as shown in Exhibits J, K, L 
and l\1, as more particularly set forth in the analysis of 
his testimony in the above Statement of Facts, are the 
strongest evidence that the injuries which caused the 
blood to spatter as indicated by these findings, could not 
have been caused by the defendant, whose clothes and 
person were free from such blood spots. How can this 
evidence justify a finding that the defendant could bang 
his wife's head against the floor and walls of this room 
for a period of more than twenty five minutes, causing 
the injuries which she suffered, without his clothes com-
ing in contact with the blood that spurted out on the 
walls, the floor, the chair, and other furniture in the 
room~ Defendant's counsel condemn most severally the 
inadequate and slothful investigation made by the de-
tectives in this case. The F.B.I. were never called in to 
make a thorough investigation of the physical evidence 
in the room in which the deceased died. The F.B.I. labor-
atories were never used in the examination of alleged 
blood spots. The furniture, including the chair, was not 
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preserved. The failure to n1ake a proper analysis of 
alleged blood spots, the total failure to type the blood 
spots with that of the deceased, the failure to make an 
observation as to the presence of incriminating evidence 
under the finger nails of the defendant, the grossly in-
adequate autopsy by an ordinary physician not quali-
fied in the field of pathological research and the failure 
to make a vaginal examination to determine if there had 
been a criminal assault, are a sad commentary on the 
ability of the detection officials in this case. It appears 
to defendant's counsel that the detectives drew a conclu-
sion that defendant killed his wife and then proceeded to 
rule out any and all other theories, even though they ig-
nored the duty of a competent investigator to protect 
the innocent as well as convict the guilty. From the fac-
tual point of view, we ask in all sincerity, where is the 
evidence that will justify a finding that the defendant 
killed his wife~ 
We again repeat it is not the duty of the defendant 
to explain the injuries suffered by the deceased when 
there is no evidence to show any causal connection with 
such injuries and the actions of the defendant. By way of 
conjecture, sometime prior to this unfortunate death of 
Mrs. Penderville, the defendant suffered a fractured 
skull as a result of a beating administered by the de-
ceased's former husband. Is it unreasonable to conjec-
ture that such a person may have encountered Mrs. 
Penderville in her apartment and committed the alleged 
injuries~ It is rather peculiar that when l\Ir. Penderville 
left his wife was in bed fully clothed except for her shoes; 
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that when he returned she was practically nude on the 
floor. No person in their right mind would have us be-
lieve that a husband would tear the clothes from his 
wife. What motive or reason did Mr. Penderville have 
to slaughter his wife in the manner which the State would 
have us believe~ There was no evidence. offered by the 
State to show a nwdical or other record of the defendant 
which may even suggest any form of violence or sexual 
perversion or abberation such as Psychomotor Epilepsy. 
The highly incompetent testimony of Dr. Maurice Taylor 
introduced over the objections of defendant's counsel con-
cerning the condition in which he found the deceased at 
the Newhouse Hotel on the 13th of ~lay, 1952, is pertinent 
in this, that not an iota of evidence can be found in the 
record to show any causal connection of the defendant 
with this episode. One thing is certain, if the defendant 
was implicated in any way, the State would have intro-
duced the evidence to show criminal intent on the subse-
quent occasion now before the court. The only evidence 
in the entire record which has the slightest bearing upon 
the question of intent is the statement of the caretaker, 
G. J .. l\Inrphy, who testified that on or about the 1st of 
July, 1952, approximately thirty days before the death of 
l\Irs. Penderville, he heard the defendant arguing with 
his wife in the bedroom. Defendant said, "Get up, get up, 
get up off your dead ass and get me something to eat. 
You haven't cooked me ten meals in the last six months." 
The deceased's experience at the Newhouse Hotel on May 
13th, resulting in terrific traumatic injuries as testified 
to by Dr. Taylor, would have been invaluable evidence 
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in deterrnining the question of criminal intent on the part 
of the defendant, provided the State had offered evidence 
proving the defendant committed the assault upon his 
wife at the Newhouse Hotel resulting in the injuries 
aforesaid. \Vithout this causal connection the testimony 
is highly incornpetent, immaterial, and the objection of 
defendant's counsel should have been sustained until the 
State produced the evidence that the defendant commit-
ted the assault in question. That no such evidence was 
produced is indicative of the fact that the defendant did 
not commit the assault. Dr. Taylor testified as follows: 
·•A. Well, I first saw the patient in the New-
house Hotel. She was in a very ragged physical 
condition. She was thin and very disturbed emo-
tionally. She had lacerations of her seal p, back of 
her head, from which was oozing a purulent ma-
terial. She was bruised around both eyes. Her 
face was battered and bruised. She had bruises 
on her body. She had evidences of fractured ribs 
on both the right and the left side in front, and 
she was bruised down over her private areas and 
on her legs. On taking her to the hospital, we x-
rayed her chest, which showed evidences of fairly 
recent healing fractures on both sides of the chest 
and the ribs. She had a skull x-ray done in which 
there was unequivocal evidence of the possibility 
of a fissure fracture of the skull. As a result of 
her bruising and so on, we did liver function tests 
and blood studies to see if there was any relation-
ship between that and a bleeding tendency. The 
studies did not prove any relationship, and there 
were no other evidences of spontaneous bleeding 
during that period of time, and during all the 
period I knew her from '49 to '52 there were never 
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any evidences of spontaneous bleeding or bleeding 
of any unusual nature." (R. 282-283). 
The admission of this evidence under the ruling of 
the court that it was competent in determining "whether 
or not she (the deceased) would have a tendency to bleed 
rnore so than ordinarily" on a subsequent occasion more 
than 2lf2 1nonths later is beyond credence. The admission 
of this evidence with the court's approval would naturally 
inflame and prejudice laymen jurors who, under the cir-
cumstances, would not be capable of properly analyzing 
such evidence. The fine distinction advanced by the 
court for its admission would be lost in the inflamed and 
prejudiced minds of laymen. 
Furthermore, the burden is upon the State to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements in the 
crime of murder in the second degree: 
"1. That on or about the 30th day of July, 1952, at 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Edgar 
Ronald Penderville killed June Weiler Penderville. 
2. That the killing was with malice aforethought. 
3. That defendant intended to kill June Weiler 
Penderville but that he did not deliberate or premeditate 
upon the killing, or that the defendant did not intend to 
kill June Weiler Penderville but that he did intend to 
do great bodily harm to June Weiler Penderville. 
4. That said killing was unlawful. 
5. That the killing was felonious. 
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6. That the said June \Y eiler Penderville died with-
in a year and a day after the cause of death was adminis-
tered." ( ~ee Ins. No. 1:2, R. ~S). 
\Vhere is there any evidence to support the element 
of •·malice aforethought" as defined by Instruction No. 
13 (R. 29). There is not a scintilla of evidence in the 
entire case with the widest possible implication that 
would justify a finding that the defendant killed his wife 
with malice aforethought. The criminal code of the State 
of r tah provides, "that in every crime or public offense 
there must be a union or joint operation of act and intent 
or criminal negligence." (76-1-20 Criminal Code, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953). Criminal negligence only comes 
into the crime of involuntary manslaughter. All other 
degrees of homicide require the element of criminal 
intent. First- and second degree murder require that the 
intent must be coupled with malice aforethought. The 
record is silent as to any evidence direct or otherwise 
that the defendant ever had a criminal intent to kill ills 
wife with malice aforethought. The elements of the crime 
of which he was convicted are not sustained by the evi-
dence and defendant contends that there is a total lack 
of evidence to justify a finding that defendant had any-
thing to do with the death of his wife, June Weiler 
Penderville. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM J. CHRISTEN-
SEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE CONVERSATIONS HE HAD 
WITH DEFENDANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE 
WAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PENDERVILLE 
APARTMENT. 
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William J. Christensen was called as a witness by 
the State and interrogated with reference to the con-
ditions and circurnstances that he found at the Pender-
ville apartment when he arrived there and at the time 
Mrs. Penderville was on the floor of the apartment dying. 
The testimony of Mr. Christensen is fully set forth in 
the Statement of Facts, pages 20-24 and 34, and will 
not be repeated in detail here. The State, upon cross 
examination by counsel for defendant, objected to Mr. 
Christensen testifying as to any conversations he had 
with defendant during this period of time. It should be 
remembered that Mrs. Penderville was dying and was 
on the floor of the apartment. The State objected to the 
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay and im-
proper cross-examination and the court sustained the 
objection, and refused to allow the witness to testify in 
any respect as to the conversations. Upon the witness 
William J. Christensen being called by the defense, the 
defense again attempted to secure the context of the 
conversations that were had during this period of time 
between :Mr. Christensen and defendant. The State 
again objected, this time upon the ground it was hearsay, 
and calling for self-serving statements. Again this court 
sustained the objection of the State and refused to allow 
the witness to testify with regard to these conversations. 
It is defendant's contention that the lower court erred in 
refusing to allow this witness to testify with reference 
to the conversations at that time. The State fully inter-
rogated the witness with respect to the conditions he 
found a.t the time he arrived at the Penderville apart-
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ment. It is defendant's contention that these statements 
and conversations during this period of time were part of 
the res gestae and c01npetent and ad1nissible to be pre-
sented to the jury. The American Law Institute, Model 
Code of Evidence, par. 512, Contemporaneous or Spon-
taneous Statements, states: 
"Evidence of a hearsay statement is admissi-
ble if the judge finds that the hearsay statement 
was made (a) while the declarant was perceiving 
the event or condition which the statement nar-
rates or describes or explains, or immediately 
thereafter; or (b) while the declarant was under 
the stress of a nervous excitement caused by his 
perception of the event or condition which the 
statement narrates or describes or explains." 
"Comment: It is generally held that it is 
unnecessary that the declarant be qualified as a 
witness in this exception to the hearsay rule. 
Clauses (a) and (b) require that the declarant 
shall have perceived the event or condition, so 
that the requisites of Ru1e 104 are necessarily 
complied with. Clause (a) is in accord with the 
theory and result of a large number of cases. It 
expresses what Professor James Bradley Thayer 
believed to be the ru1e applied in the so called res 
gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule. * * * Clause 
(b) also is in accord with the theory and result of 
a large number of cases. It expresses what Dean 
Wigmore believes to be the rule applicable in the 
res gestae exceptions, and is accepted in a large 
majority of the modern opinions * * * ." 
In DILLARD V. STATE, 165 So. 783, 786, 27 Ala. 
App. 50, the court states: 
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"On the question as to what constitutes the 
res gestae there can be no set rule. From the 
facts of ea'ch case the question of res gestae must 
be determined. The expression 'res gestae' as 
applied to crime, mean~ t~e complete. crimi~al 
transaction from its beginning or starting pomt 
in the act of the accused until the end is reached. 
As stated, what in any case constitutes the res 
gestae of the crime depends wholly on the charac-
ter of the crime and the circumstances of the case. 
Generally, the rule appears to be, in homicide 
cases, that all the surroundings and circumstances 
attending the killing, the declarations of the 
accused at and after the killing, and his conduct 
at and after the killing, while at or near the scene, 
are admissible and form part of the res gestae." 
June Penderville wa~ dying at the time William J. 
Christensen arrived at the apartment, and she passed 
away some forty-five minutes after he arrived. Certainly, 
based upon the rule of res gestae, the utterances, decla-
rations and conduct of the accused during this forty-five 
minute period are relevant and should be allowed to be 
placed before the jury. 
In the case of JACKSON Y. UTAH RAPID 
TRANSIT CO., 77 U 21, 290 P. 970, 976, the court stated: 
"The general limitations of the res gestae 
rule are 'That the declaration or utterance must 
be spontaneous or instinctive; that it must relate 
to or be connected with the main or principal 
event or transaction itself material and admissible 
in evidence and that it must have been the result 
or product, the outgrowth, of the immediate and 
present influences of the main event, or preceding 
circumstances to which it relates, and must be 
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contemporaneous with it and tend to explain or 
elucidate it. * ** * That the word 'contemporane-
ous' is not taken literally, and that time is not 
the real governing factor in the determination, but 
is an important element in determining whether 
the statements are spontaneous and immediately 
connected with the main transaction and prompted 
or produced by its immediate and present influ-
ence." 
The State in interrogating the witness Christensen 
opened up the case with respect to physical conditions 
found by witness Christensen, i.e., the position of the 
body, condition of the body, the fact that defendant was 
there present, the conduct of the photographers and 
detectives in arranging the body, etc., thereby raising 
inferences and suspicion in the minds of the jurors that 
the victim, June Penderville, had been murdered and that 
defendant was the murderer. Certainly defendant is 
entitled to bring out the entire transaction and circum-
stances, the utterances that were made, in order to pre-
sent to the jury a complete picture of what occurred dur-
ing this forty-five minute period of time in which June 
Penderville was dying. Certainly he should be given the 
right to rebut these inferences which the State has built 
up by going into the conditions and circumstances that 
existed. Refusal to allow defendant to rebut that testi-
mony by bringing out the utterances and conversations 
that were had was prejudicial and erroneous. 
It has been stated as a general rule that where the 
State's case rests largely upon circumstantial evidence 
greater latitude is allowed in admission of circumstances 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
76 
which tend to throw light on any issues in the case. See 
ETHRIDGE V. STATE, 110 SW 2d 576, 133 Texas Crim. 
Rep. 287. Certainly such would be the case in the.present 
prosecution as the State?s entire case is rested upon cir-
cumstantial evidence. 
In Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 1, par. 315, 
page 425, Explanation of Motive, Intent, etc. it is stated: 
"It is clear that facts and circumstances in 
every transaction exhibit two phases: First, 
relevancy to establish an ultimate fact; second, an 
explanation of the facts and circumstances them-
selves that is relevant against the ultimate facts. 
In this view the entire transaction should go be-
fore the court, the accused's whole conduct-his 
utterances, his acts, and demeanor-should be 
received-and his explanation of his acts, con-
duct, and demeanor should go in to rebut or nega-
tive the case against him. Any exclusion of this 
renders the decisions of the various courts inde-
fensively inconsistent and places an arbitrary 
limit upon the accused which is unjust in view of 
the freedom allowed the prosecution in adducing 
facts and circumstances against him." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion defendant submits that the judgment 
and conviction of the trial court should be declared null 
and void for the reasons stated herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & 
McCULLOUGH 
417 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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